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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In May of 2007, the Swaffords, (Plaintiffs) received marketing materials from Huntsman 
Springs (Defendant) establishing a special "priority sales event" for local purchasers in advance 
of opening the development sales to the general public. (R. Vol. 1 p. 14-17 .) The real property 
which is the subject of this action is located adjacent to the City of Driggs, Teton County Idaho. 
The Plaintiffs are residents of Idaho Falls, Bonneville County Idaho. 
The marketing literature stated: 
Teton Co. and Driggs have become the hottest real estate 
market in the west. We have established a "Sales Priority 
Reservation Program" for early buyers the best values will likely 
be for those that act first. 
Please know our Huntsman Team is absolutely committed 
to the highest levels of quality and creating the best possible values 
for you and your family. 
At the bottom of the marketing material, on R. Vol. 1 p. 15, there is a footnote and an 
email address www.huntsmansprings.com for the Master Plan and national articles on Teton 
Valley. The Master Plan is no longer accessible from the site, as it has been removed. Pictures 
provided on the site are contained in the transcript. (R. Vol. 1 p. 214 to 234) The Plaintiffs 
attended the event and were given a Master Plan, (R. Vol. 1 p. 43) which was described as a 
1347 acre resort development at completion of the development, several years away. (An exact 
duplicate color copy of the Master Plan is attached hereto, Attachment A, as the black and white 
copies show little detail.) 
Defendant's sales agents described the commercial lots as being reserved for a 300 unit 
conference hotel and commercial building. The Master Plan was a comprehensive colored 
depiction of the completed development, with golf courses, luxury five star hotels, a promenade, 
a recreation center, condominiums, restaurants, a 300 unit conference center, and six public 
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parks. R. Vol. 1 p. 143-145 and 149) (Attachment A to this appellate brief is the exact duplicate 
color copy for review.) 
The Master Plan provided Plaintiffs at the sales meeting depicted the five (5) commercial 
lots, as the only commercial development on the Master Plan. The Master Plan/ Final Plat R. 
Vol. 1 p. 45 (hereinafter "Plat") recorded after purchase, contains the same five (5) commercial 
lots as the only commercial lots in the Plat or Master Plan. 
The promotional materials (R. Vol. 1 p. 215 to 216) include the following statements 
regarding commercial development: 
"Huntsman Springs is an excellent investment. ... " Of all the plans under 
consideration one of the most exciting for the community is the luxury 
lodge, which would be the first of this caliber in Teton Valley, Idaho. Not 
only will a luxury lodge fill a void in high end accommodations, but will 
also create valuable employment in the greater community .... " Proposed 
concepts include gourmet restaurant, spa and conference area, all within 
the village setting that will also feature its own ice rink." 
The Master Plan identified 195 Primrose as being adjacent to Primrose street with trees 
on the W estem Boundary between the lot and Primrose; a public walk way and bike path on the 
Eastern boundary, adjacent to the city. (See Attachment A hereto, a duplicate ofR. Vol. 1 p.143-
145.) 
In reliance upon Defendant's Master Plan, the Plaintiffs executed a purchase contract for 
the lot at 195 Primrose, Driggs, Idaho on July 16, 2007 (R. Vol. 1 p. 24-35) for the purchase 
price of $387,000.00. (See Attachment A, colored duplicate; R. Vol. 1 p. 143-145). The 
Defendant executed an acceptance of the contract on July 18, 2007.( R. Vol. 1 p. 36) 
The development was in its infancy on the date of purchase, with years of construction 
necessary for completion. The development is not completed today, and is anticipated to take 
until at least 2020, as evidenced by the City of Driggs Comprehensive Plan of January 19, 2010, 
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amended January 8, 2015. (R. Vol. 1 p. 147). This comprehensive plan was prepared January 19, 
2020, and amended to its current content on January 8, 2015, R. Vol. 1 p. 149, contains 
additional statements pertaining to the commercial lots, including the lot purchased by Plaintiffs. 
The comprehensive plan stated in 2015 the following: 
The mixed use commercial area around the new county courthouse was 
conceived partly as a new location for the many uses in the visitor retail 
area of the Central Business District, but also as a location for upper floor 
residential units and a hotel that could in turn increase downtown retail 
demand. As of.fall of 2014, none of the properties around the courthouse 
have been developed. (emphasis added). 
On June 16, 2014, Jon Huntsman provided a press release pertaining to Huntsman 
Springs. (Tr. P. 159-164, on page 160 of the news release by Huntsman states in bold print: 
"We are only in our third year of development and have a way to go, but I see this as a 
40,50 or even 60 year pro;ect ... " (emphasis added) 
The owner and originator of Huntsman Springs admits that as of 2014 the development 
was only in its third year of development. This statement verifies that the development did not 
actually begin until 2011 or 2012, approximately 3 years prior to the Plaintiff's filing their 
original complaint. 
In August of 2014, the Plaintiff's became aware of the "Mast~r Plan Final Plat," 
recorded July 20, 2007, two days after the purchase contract was executed by the Defendant. 
The Defendant recorded a Plat, (hereinafter referred to as the "Plat") which was not previously 
provided to Plaintiff by Defendant, nor mentioned in negotiations. (R. Vol. 1 p. 90) An 
examination of the Master Plan colored photo, Attachment A, and the Plat, R. Vol. 1 p. 90, shows 
the depiction of an extremely narrow strip of land sandwiched in between the commercial lots 
and Primrose Street. The writing on the narrow strip is illegible. The illegible writing later was 
recently identified as stating "park 3." 
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The Master Plan or Plat did not identify any access route from Front Street to the 
commercial lots. The Plat did not depict any indication that access to the commercial lots was 
not via Primrose Street. The logical implication from the appearance of the Master Plan, was that 
the commercial lots were a part of Huntsman Springs, with the front of the lots abutting 
Primrose, the Courthouse, and the Huntsman Springs development as depicted by the photos 
contained as R. Vol. 1 p. 212. The photo in 2012 further depicts the view toward Huntsman 
Springs from Primrose. The narrow strip's identification on the Plat did not suggest, imply or 
indicate Plaintiffs' access via Primrose was obstructed permanently by the separation of a berm 
and line of seedling trees. The trees which are shown on the photo (R. Vol. 1 p. 212) were 
seedlings when planted, and grew very quickly. Considering the well advertised long term nature 
of the development, the location of the trees and small berm were not deemed permanent 
obstructions to opening access routes to Primrose from 195 Primrose for commercial 
development once it began. Development still has not begun on these lots. 
The recorded Plat did not preclude cutting an access route from Primrose to 195 
Primrose at some undetermined time in the future. The Plat did not change the Master Plan's 
location of the public walkway or bike paths on the eastern boundary of 195 Primrose, nor the 
location for trees on both the east and west boundary of 195 Primrose. Today, the Defendant has 
not installed the required public walkway, bike paths or trees required by the Master Plan 
(Attachment A) on the east boundary of 195 Primrose. The 2015 Comprehensive Plan as stated 
above, confirms that development has not begun on the commercial lots. R. Vol. 1 p. 149 The 
Plat did not alter or change the Plaintiffs' legal description or affect title. 
The 1347 acre development remains incomplete today. The improvements on the Master 
Plan are incomplete on 195 Primrose, as confirmed by the 2015 City of Driggs Comprehensive 
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Plan. The abutting streets on the east and west side of 195 Primrose have been paved. A 
sidewalk/walk way was placed on the west boundary as were seedling trees. However it is 
undisputed that the trees and public walkway have not been completed pursuant to the Master 
Plan on the east side of 195 Primrose. 
The western boundary trees and path were improvements which made the commercial 
lots more esthetically pleasing, and presumably more marketable. These improvements were 
deemed desirable to the value and marketability of the commercial lots when completed. The 
timeline hereinafter depicts the ongoing development and the basis for Plaintiffs' beliefs that the 
development of the commercial lot at 195 Primrose according to the Master Plan was to be 
expected in the future. It was not until 2014, that the Plaintiffs, as well as the general public in 
Driggs, became aware that the Defendant was "mothballing" the commercial lots, and intended 
to ignore the Master Plan and the Plat. A demand for compliance with the Master Plan was made 
on August 14, 2014 by letter from the Plaintiffs. (R. Vol. 1 p. 193-194). The Defendant 
responded September 3, 2014 (R. Vol. 1 p. 196-197). Until 2014, Plaintiffs presumed the 
Defendant would complete the development according to the Master Plan. 
The Defendant contends that the only access to 195 Primrose is Front Street, which faces 
the back side of old dilapidated old buildings which are an extreme eyesore. The photographs (R. 
Vol. 1 pp. 203-208) evidence the ramshackle old buildings across Front Street which 
dramatically reduces if not eliminates the marketability of these expensive commercial lots. 
Plaintiffs are currently left with a valueless parcel of commercial real property for which they 
paid over a third of a million dollars. It was incomprehensible and ludicrous to anticipate 
Defendant to limit access to the commercial lots from Front Street, considering the decaying, 
dilapidated condition of the backside of old buildings. 
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TIME LINE OF EVENTS FROM STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. In May 2007: Plaintiffs were provided with promotional marketing materials and notice 
of a special sales event restricted to local Idaho residents allegedly intended to provide "ground 
floor special opportunities."( R. Vol. 1 p. 123, 159) 
2. The promotional materials were primarily brochures and a Master Plan depicting the 
future of the entire development over the life of the long term development. (Attachment A-
colored duplicate, see also R. Vol. 1 p. 143 to 145, black and white) 
3. July 16, 2007: Plaintiffs signed the purchase and sales contract. The Defendant signed it 
and approved the contract on July 18, 2007. It consummated the purchase of the commercial lot 
located at 195 Primrose, Driggs Idaho, during the corporate sales invitation event. Plaintiffs 
were provided the Master Plan, depicting the future of this "long term development" involving a 
golf course, luxury five star hotels, a promenade titled City Walk, a recreation center, 
condominiums, restaurants, a 300 unit conference center, six public parks, a residential 
development and golf club in the 1347 acre comprehensive commercial, residential and 
recreational plan.( R. Vol. 1 p. 159) (Attachment A hereto is a colored copy for convenience and 
clarification) 
4. July 20, 2007 two days after Plaintiffs' purchase, the Defendant recorded a Plat for the 
development, which was never discussed or mentioned on July 16, 2007. Plaintiffs were not 
aware of the Plat until 2014. (R. Vol. 1 p. 45-46). However it was titled identically to the 
Master Plan provided to the Plaintiff at point of sale. The Plat is titled "Master Plan /Final Plat." 
5. The Plat recorded two days after the purchase agreement which was signed by Defendant, 
does not substantially differ from the "Master Plan" provided Plaintiffs. It does not identify any 
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additional commercial properties for future development. It does not identify any access route to 
and from 195 Primrose. It has far less detail than the Master Plan. (Attachment A) 
6. The Plat, though obscure, included a very narrow strip of land between all of the 
commercial lots and Primrose Street. This narrow strip of land is referred to on the post 
purchase Plat as "Park 3" but is illegible fine print. (R. Vol. 1 p. 45) 
7. The Plat recorded July 20, 2007 did not depict any change in the means of access or 
ingress to any of the commercial lots, including Plaintiffs'. (R. Vol. 1 p. 45) 
8. The Plaintiffs' lot is bounded by Primrose to the West and Front Street to the east. The 
Plat fails to depict access routes to the commercial lots from either street. (R. Vol. 1 p. 45) 
9. The Plat does not depict any change in the location of any walkways or bike paths 
included within the Master Plan. (R. Vol. 1 p. 45) 
10. 2007 to 2015 tax notices: All tax notices received by the Plaintiffs from 2007 to the 
present, depicts the address of the commercial lot as 195 Primrose, Driggs Idaho. All taxes were 
paid as they came due on the commercial lot located at 195 Primrose, Driggs Idaho. (R. Vol. 1 
p. 191) 
11. Fall of 2008: Small seedling trees were planted on the west side of Plaintiffs' lot on the 
border between Primrose and Plaintiffs' lot. Simultaneously, a small strip of grass was planted in 
the narrow strip of land between Primrose and the commercial lots. Neither development 
foreclosed future access to Primrose from the commercial lots. 
12. Late fall of 2008: Primrose and Front Street were paved neither indicating or evidencing 
access to or from the commercial lots, or permanently preventing future access. (R. Vol. 1 p. 
207-Front Street and R. Vol. 1 p. 212-Primrose Street) 
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13. Fall of 2008: the Defendant installed a bike path and walkway on the west side of 
Plaintiffs' lot, on the border between the commercial lot and Primrose. These improvements did 
not suggest or prohibit later installation of an access route from Primrose to the commercial lots. 
The improvements improved the esthetics of the location making it appear more desirable for 
commercial development. The trees, walk way, and bike path identified on the Master Plan for 
the east boundary have not been completed. (R. Vol. 1 p. 207, 143, 145, Attachment A) 
14. The Activity Center was completed in 2012. (R. Vol. 1 p. 164) 
15. In 2013 the board walk was constructed, as was the fitness center, locker rooms, pool and 
hot tubs. (R. Vol. 1 p. 159-162) 
16. The Wellness center was completed in June of 2014. (R. Vol. 1 p. 169) 
17. In June of 2014, Jon Huntsman stated in a news conference article that Huntsman Springs 
was only in the third year of the development, and that they had a long way to go. In 2014, 
Defendant stated that it was "long term project." (R. Vol. 1 p. 157) 
18. 2015 construction plans on the "Park side" of the project began. 
19. In the fall of 2014, the citizens of Driggs became aware that the Defendant was 
proposing changes which conflict with the design proposals the Defendant made to obtain 
original approval. A citizen's committee was formed called "VARD." (Valley Advocates for 
Responsible Development). In September of 2014, public meetings were held on the complaints 
which were registered over the Defendant ignoring the south end of the development being the 
location of the commercial lots. V ARD as well as the Plaintiffs became concerned for the first 
time that the Defendant's publicized plans for commercial development were being changed. 
VARD President David Axelrod published an article in the Teton Valley News and Valley 
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Citizen which described the surprise of the citizenry along with the Plaintiffs with regard to 
changes in the development. Mr. Axelrod stated: 
Did you know that the resort hotel and conference center we all 
thought were planned next to the county courthouse has been 
mothballed indefinitely-likely forever-while Huntsman instead 
pursues a luxury resort at the far north end of the development. 
The building sites plans for this north end hotel resort including a 
spa, pool, tennis courts, fitness center, cafe and two restaurants, 
conference facilities and plaza both a 6166 Sq. ft. excursion center 
and approximately 13,500 s. ft. of commercial retail."( R. Vol. 1 p. 
174) 
"When Huntsman Springs first applied to create its 1347 acre 
development it presented a comprehensive residential and 
recreational plan that would be integrated with the city of Driggs. 
Huntsman insisted on the current location of the new County 
Courthouse as one way to connect their development to the town. 
They platted a 300 unit conference hotel and commercial buildings 
in the empty fields surrounding the freshly built courthouse". (R. 
Vol. lp.175) 
"Just last month, with several missing pieces of critical information 
land without receiving any pre-hearing public comment, the 
Driggs' P and Z recommended allowing Huntsman to now focus 
their hotel resort and their commercial plaza a mile north into the 
development where it will not provide Driggs with any of the 
promised and anticipated benefits of integration with the City, 
revitalization of Driggs west side, or stimulation of downtown 
Driggs economy." (R. Vol. 1 p. 175-176) 
"The public notices were vague and did not disclose Huntsman 
Springs proposal to abandon the promised hotel next to the 
courthouse, nor to create the remote commercial plaza, or the 
changes to the public pathways. Huntsman says it no longer makes 
economic sense to fulfill its original promise." (R. Vol. 1 p. 176) 
"Bait and switch on Huntsman Springs? Is Driggs getting 
Steamrolled?"( R. Vol. 1 p. 176) 
20. On Sept. 10, 2014 V ARD Issued a public comment to the City of Driggs, City Counsel. 
The public comment ofVARD contains the following: 
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"Right now Huntsman is mothballing indefinitely their original 
intention of building and investing in downtown Driggs with a 
hotel and supporting facilities west of the County Courthouse. At 
the August 14, P and Z hearing Huntsman representatives 
emphasized that there were no plans and no intention to do 
anything with the downtown hotel site in the foreseeable future. 
Instead they seek to invest their resource is a different hotel site far 
removed from the city center. With the developer expressing no 
interest in developing their lots already zoned for hotel and 
commercial sites, this will effectively kill any other interest in 
investing in this area. This barren land which abuts Driggs 
commercial core is likely to persist as undeveloped years if not 
decades and must be remediated to control blight in interim." 
"All of the original Huntsman Springs plats and plans depict the 
hotel that is zoned next to the County Courthouse." (R. Vol. l 
p.185) 
21. In August of 2014, the citizens who reside and work in Teton Valley became aware for 
the first time that Huntsman was refusing to comply with the Master Plan and Plat, to develop 
the commercial lots, and provide access routes to 195 Primrose. 
The Plaintiffs submit, that if the local citizenry, who work, live and take part in the 
politics and local government learned of the Defendant's refusal to develop according to the 
Master Plan in August of 2014, the Plaintiffs should not be held to a different standard. It was 
not until 2014, that the Plaintiffs and the citizens of Driggs became aware that the Defendant was 
focusing future commercial development to the far Northern end of the development, ignoring 
the Master Plan for the commercial lots sold to Plaintiffs and others. 
22. The Defendant never recorded any Plat identifying any access routes to 195 Primrose. 
There exists no plat identifying access to the commercial lot purchased by Plaintiffs. 
23. On July 17, 2015 after attempting to resolve the dispute with the Defendant and all 
attempts failing, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter. 
24. Defendant field an Answer on September 28, 2015. 
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25. On September 29, 2015, Defendant filed for Summary Judgment The Summary 
Judgment was supported by affidavits and a memorandum of law. 
26. Plaintiffs objected to the Summary Judgment on November 3, 2015. The Objection was 
supported with a memorandum of law and affidavits. 
27. Defendant replied to the Objection on November 10, 2015. 
28. Hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held on November 17, 2015. 
29. On November 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a request to amend the Complaint with the Court 
and a request to submit additional evidence on the Summary Judgment. 
30. On February 19, 2016 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
31. Plaintiffs field the Notice of Appeal in this matter on May 5, 2016. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
L Was Summary Judgment improperly granted on the basis of the Statute of 
Limitations? 
II. Was Summary Judgment improperly granted as a genuine issue of material fact 
existed? 
III. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs hereby request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § § 1 120 
and 12-121; Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54; Appellate Rules 40 and 41; and, all other 
applicable rules and statutes .. On appeal Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) compels an award attorney 
fees to the prevailing party in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. A commercial 
transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes." LC.§ 12-120(3). In this case, the underlying transaction between the parties, the sale 
and purchase of certain commercial property, was commercial in nature. Each claim has been 
brought and defended based on the record before this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ll\1PROPERL Y GRANTED ON THE BASIS OF 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? 
Idaho Code § 5-216 sets forth the five (5) year limitation for actions filed for written 
contracts. When this five (5) year period begins to run is based upon when a cause of action has 
accrued, meaning when there is a breach of the contract. Simmons v. Simmons, 134 Idaho 824, 
830, 11 P.3d 20, 26 (2000). The question of when a breach of contract occurs is a factual one. 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P.2d 714, 721 (1994). The five year statute of 
limitations will only begin to run when the party asserting the breach is aware of the breach, or 
should have been aware. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (2008). 
When the breach of contract is known or should have been known is a question of fact for the 
jury. Spence at 771. 
An action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is subject to a two (2) year statute of 
limitations from the time the cause of action "accrued" pursuant to I.C. §48-619. 
An action for misrepresentation is subject to a three (3) year statute of limitation pursuant 
to I.C.§5-218. 
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When assessing a motion for summary 
judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the 
motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); 
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). 
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The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). 
The District Court found all Plaintiffs' claims were barred for failure to bring those 
claims within the applicable statute oflimitations. R. Vol. 2, pp. 340-342. To support this 
finding, the District Court made three (2) critical errors: 
A. The District Court found that the Plat recorded by Defendant on July 20, 2007 (R. Vol. 
1, p. 45) was constructive notice of the breach, and therefore the damage, by Defendant. R. Vol. 
2, pp. 340-341 
B. The District Court found that the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the breach, and 
therefore the damage, by the Defendant by August, 2008 by virtue of the "construction of the 
park and planting of the trees." R. Vol. 2. P. 341 
A. CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM THE RECORDED PLAT 
The District Court stated the Plat recorded by the Defendant on July 20, 2007 constituted 
constructive knowledge of a breach by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. The District Court based 
this finding on the case of Chaplin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306,230 P.2d 998 (1951) which the 
District quoted, '"'the recording of an instrument affecting the title to real property constitutes 
constructive notice to all parties interested," because they "had the means of acquiring that 
knowledge."" R. Vol. 2, p. 341 
The Court in Chaplin dealt with an entirely different issue. In Chaplin, the appellants 
claimed ownership to a real property previously transferred by recorded deed to their father. The 
Court in Chaplin states, 
"The general rule in this jurisdiction is that the recording of an instrument affecting the 
title to real property constitutes constructive notice to all parties interested, of the 
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contents, and the estate claimed thereby." Chaplin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 310, 230 
P.2d 998, 1002 (1951) (emphasis added). 
The decision then goes on to state, 
"While it is stipulated that the appellants did not know of their interest in 
those lots until about a year before this suit was brought, that makes no 
difference, for they had the means of acquiring that knowledge, as the 
deed conveying the title to said lots to their father was of record during all 
that time in the office of the county recorder of Ada county, where said 
lots were situated. The means of acquiring this knowledge was open to 
them, and, under the facts of this case, that places them in the same 
position as though they had such knowledge." Id at 311, 1003. 
The appellants in Chaplin were prospective heirs, whose title was directly affected by the 
previously recorded deed. 
The holding in Chaplin only imputes constructive knowledge when the recorded 
document affects the actual title to the property, and then only as to the contents of the actual 
document. 
B. THE PLAT HAD NO EFFECT UPON PLAINTIFFS' TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 
The first question is did the Plat affect the title to the real property of the Plaintiffs? 
When viewing the Plat (R. Vol. 1, p. 45), it is clear that this document does not affect or alter the 
title or property of the Plaintiffs. This document only identifies various lots within the Huntsman 
Springs PUD 1 Addition. The Plat does not make any change to the legal description of the 
Plaintiffs' property, does not create any additional or decreased interest in the ownership of the 
real property and places no restrictions on the real property. The Plat does affect the title of the 
real property of the Plaintiffs. 
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C. THE PLAT DID NOT PROVIDE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THAT PLAINTIFFS 
HAD NO FUTURE ACCESS VIA PRIMROSE STREET OR ACCESS FROM FRONT 
STREET 
The Plat is labeled "MASTER PLAN/FINAL PLAT." The copy provided by the Title 
Company is identical with the Plat in evidence. R. Vol. 1 p. 43 The Plat is nearly illegible, with 
umeadable fine print. With the use of a magnifier, one can depict the words park 3. Park 3 had 
no discernable meaning to Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs continued to receive and rely upon tax 
notices (R. Vol. 1 p. 191) which describe the address as 195 Primrose. The narrow strip of grass 
or sidewalk does not preclude the Defendant from providing access to the commercial lots. The 
improvements were esthetically pleasing and consistent with Plaintiffs' conclusion that they 
were made in an effort to comply with the Master Plan, and improve commercial value of the 
lots to invite construction. It was anticipated from the date of the first contact with the 
Defendant, that the lots were intended for a large luxury hotel, which would have required all of 
them, and involved one source of access from Primrose. The Plat does not identify where the 
access route to 195 Primrose would be when the commercial development occurred. 
The appearance and location of the commercial lots, with improvements made it obvious 
that the front would face the Huntsman development, and not the back side of dilapidated old 
buildings. It would be illogical to expect commercial developers to front their business toward 
this run down area. 
D. THE PLAT DOES NOT DESIGNATE ACCESS TO 195 PRIMROSE 
FROM ANY ABUTTING STREET 
The Plat has no substantial difference with the Master Plan. There is only one difference 
between the Master Plan and Plat It is the small strip of land separating the commercial lots 
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from Primrose actually labeled as "park 3." The remainder of the improvements required by the 
Master Plan have not been completed to date. The walk way, bike path, and trees depicted on the 
Master Plan for the east boundary await construction. 
The Plat does not show the location of any access to the commercial lots, unlike the 
Master Plan. The Plat does not depict any trees, fences, berms or other landscaping additions. 
The Plat does not depict the location of walkways or bike paths. The Plat does show the outer 
boundary of the development being the east side of the Plaintiffs' property, which was always 
presumed to be the back end of the commercial lot. Considering the ongoing development 
continuing to this day, there is nothing in the contents of the Plat that would give any notice of a 
breach by the Defendant in not completing the Master Plan improvements as represented, 
including the walkway, bike path and trees on the east side of 195 Primrose, nor permanently 
separating the Plaintiffs' lot from the remainder of the development, foreclosing access via 
Primrose. 
E. WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REAL PROPRTY OWNERS 
An owner of real property should be able to rely on the status of the property at the time 
of purchase and should not be burdened to continually check all recorded documents during the 
entire period of ownership. The Plat, by its very nature, does not appear on the title of the 
property. A title search of the property would not reveal the recorded plat as a "red flag" when 
reviewing the title. A plat does not give notice of an interest or change to the title of the property. 
The recording of a plat does not provide the notice equivalent of a deed affecting the real 
property. It is not a reasonable means for notice of neither potential, adverse, changes nor 
notification that the plat is not identical to prior plats or a master plan. 
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Plaintiffs purchased their lot in reliance on the representations of the Defendant and the 
Master Plan (Attachment A) presented to them. They were never advised a subsequent plat was 
being developed or that any subsequent plat would differ from the Master Plan. They were never 
notified that the later recorded Plat did no differ substantially from the Master Plan and never 
asked to approve any changes to the Master Plan by way of a plat or other document. 
As the Plat does not affect the title of the Plaintiffs to their property and the contents of 
the Plat do not show a breach and intent to separate the property from the remainder of the 
development, the Plat cannot be held, on summary judgment, to provide constructive notice to 
the Plaintiffs of a breach by the Defendant and start the running of the Statute of Limitation on 
any claim. 
F. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BASED ON VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT 
The District Court next found that the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of a breach by the 
Defendant based on the "construction of the park and the planting of trees." (R. Vol. 2, p. 341) 
The District Court found that this work was completed by August, 2008. Id. While the 
construction of the park and planting of trees occurred, it was disputed that these actions 
constituted notice of a breach. 
The Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford in Opposition to Afotion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or Summary Judgment (R. Vol. 1 pp. 123-234) specifically addressed the issue of the 
park and trees and that this was not notice of a breach. The Affidavit states that the park and trees 
were considered to be normal in the development process and consistent with Master Plan. Id. at 
I 3 3, I 3, I 3 6, and I 3 7. Plaintiffs were informed at the time of purchase that the property and 
adjoining development were a long term project spanning many years. Plaintiffs were informed 
that in 2014 the development was only one-third completed. 
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The trees planted in 2008 were seedlings, which took several years to grow and develop 
into any type of visible divider, and even then could be removed in minutes with appropriate 
equipment. The grass on the narrow section of land (park 3) along with the seedlings and grass 
was interpreted as an improvement to invite third-party commercial development of the lots. The 
commercial lots are small, causing Plaintiffs to anticipate commercial purchasers to purchase all 
or several at one time for parking and development, and one or two large entrances where the 
developers requested on Primrose. It would have been extremely simple and inexpensive to cut a 
road through the seedlings and grass from the commercial lots on Primrose. 
The Master Plan provided for the planting of trees on the western side of the Plaintiffs' 
property. The Master Plan also provided for the planting of trees on the eastern side of the 
Plaintiffs' property. The eastern side of the Plaintiffs' property was to be the eastern boundary of 
the development according to both the Master Plan and the Plat. This boundary did not include 
Front Street on the Plat. This eastern boundary was to be a "Family Walk and Bike Path" 
according to the Master Plan. This is consistent with the Plat showing this area as the "Property 
boundary line." 
The Defendant did not designate on the Plat any type of access points along Front Street 
to indicate that Front Street was the intended future access point to 195 Primrose. 
A walk way and bike path was planned for the east side of the lots along Front Street. 
The additional identical improvements on the western border of Primrose were interpreted as 
improvements to invite commercial development by esthetically improving the view from 
Huntsman Springs. The eastern boundary walk way and bike path have not been completed to 
date. 
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None of the developments from 2007 to 2014 provided any notification that the 
Defendant was changing the development from the Master Plan. The rezoning in 2014 brought 
the issue to Plaintiffs' attention and inquiry, and thereafter the litigation. 
The question of when a breach of contract occurs is a factual one. Spence v. Howell, 126 
Idaho 763, 770, 890 P.2d 714, 721 (1994). When the breach of contract is known or should have 
been known is a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 771. The District Court's detennination of 
what determined the breach of contract and when that was actually known was an issue of fact 
still at issue. As the fact is one that must be determined by a jury, summary judgment was 
improper. 
II. WAS SUMMARY .JUDGMENT IMPROPERLY GRANTED AS A GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED? 
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When assessing a motion for summary 
judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the 
motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); 
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). 
Based on the actions of the Defendant, and specifically the rezoning, the Plaintiffs 
inquired with the Defendant about the future development of the area surrounding the Plaintiffs' 
property. Plaintiffs' letter of August 20, 2014 (R. Vol. 1 pp. 48, 56) requested compliance with 
the Master Plan in the development of the property. The response from Defendant was that it was 
not going to further develop the area around the Plaintiffs' property and refused to follow the 
Master Plan. (R. Vol. 1, p. 135) 
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Plaintiffs argue that it was not until the refusal of the Defendant to comply with the 
Master Plan in 2014 and the notification that the Defendant would not develop the area around 
the Plaintiffs' property that a breach actually occurred. It was not until the letter and the decision 
by the Defendant to not develop the property that the Plaintiffs were damaged and knew of the 
damage. Plaintiffs fully expected compliance with the Master Plan until the Fall of 2014. Until 
this time, Defendant could have continued the development of the area around the Plaintiffs' 
property at any time. None of the work around the Plaintiffs' property was of a permanent 
nature, precluding compliant development as depicted in the Master Plan. 
The determination of the date of the breach by the Defendant is a question of material 
fact. This material fact is a question that the jury should determine. 
The actions of the Defendant have destroyed the value of the Plaintiffs' commercial lot. It 
is incomprehensible to expect commercial developers to construct commercial improvements on 
the commercial lots, which now face decrepit, dilapidated and decayed back sides of old 
buildings. The actions of the Defendant have completely destroyed the value of the Plaintiffs' 
commercial lot, making it completely nonmarketable. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the courts summary judgment be reversed, and that the 
matter be remanded for trial. There are genuine issues of material fact, which are to be 
determined by the jury. There are significant issues of fact, including but not limited to the 
following: 
1. The point in time that planting of seedlings and installation of a berm and grass strip 
was grown and of such size and significance that their installation became a notice of 
breach, or coincided with the future development by enhancing the appearance. 
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2. The point in time, if ever, the physical appearance of improvements adjacent to 195 
Primrose gave constructive notice of a breach of contract. 
3. Whether the Plaintiffs had a right to rely on City/County tax notices identifying the 
address of the lot as 195 Primrose, as the location and access point for ingress or 
egress. 
4. Whether the Master Plan or Plat identified a point of ingress or egress to the 195 
primrose indicating that the sole access point was from Front Street as opposed to 
Primrose Street. 
5. Whether the continuous publications from Defendant that the development was a long 
term project spanning many years was reasonably relied upon by the Plaintiffs in 
delaying action until August of 2014. 
6. Whether an access route to 195 Primrose can be created in the future at a reasonable 
cost from Primrose street. 
7. Whether it was reasonable for the Plaintiffs to assume that the Defendant would 
create an entrance from Primrose to 195 Primrose in the future when commercial 
development began. 
8. Whether the Defendant has breached its contract with the Plaintiffs by currently 
failing and refusing to install the public walk way, bike path trees and other 
improvements depicted on the Master Plan for 195 Primrose on the Front Street 
Boundary. 
9. Whether it was reasonable more than 5 years prior to September of 2015 for the 
Plaintiffs had no intention to develop in conformity with the marketing materials 
provided at the time of purchase, as well as news publication identified herein, that 
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the Defendant would eventually build the planned commercial improvements on the 
commercial lots, as identified on the Master Plan and Plat. (luxury 5 star hotel, 
promenade, city walk, recreation center, condo's restaurants, 300 unit conference 
center, etc.) 
10. Whether the Plat as provided with limited data, and obscure print was reasonable 
notice of intent to abandon any part of the Master Plan provided at the date of 
purchase. 
11. Did the paving of both Front Street and Primrose without designated access routes 
from either, provide constructive notice of a breach by Defendant. 
12. What point in time should the Plaintiffs have known that the Defendant had no long 
range plan or intent of providing access to the commercial lots from Primrose Street. 
The Plaintiffs submit that they became aware of the Defendant's lack of intent to perform 
under the Master Plan in the fall of 2014, concurrent with the point in time the community 
became aware and the citizens complained. The Plaintiffs submit that the recording of the Plat 
was not constructive notice of breach of contract, as it did not affect Plaintiffs' title. Further, 
upon examination of the Plat filed after purchase, there is little difference between the Master 
plan provided Plaintiffs and the after purchase Plat, which contains only a drawing of a tiny strip 
of land with illegible markings adjacent. The Defendant represented throughout that the 
commercial lots identified in the Master Plan and Plat were the future locations of hotels, 
convention center and other commercial developments. 
The Defendant has breached its agreement, and breached its obligation with regard to 
good faith and fair dealing. The Defendant's final marketing brochure provided May 7, 2007 
stated: 
26 
"Please know that our entire Huntsman te.am is absolutely 
committed to the highest levels of quality and creating the best 
possible values for you and your family". (emphasis added) 
R. Vol. 1 p. 15 
The Defendant marketed these lots with the intent that the Plaintiffs rely on their 
representations. The Defendant provided a Master Plan, which was described as the future of the 
development. The Defendant informed the Plaintiffs that this was a long term project and would 
take years to complete. The Defendant continued the development, and paved the adjacent streets 
to 195 Primrose. The improvements between 105 Primrose and Primrose Street were minor 
improvements involving some seedling trees, some grass and a walk path. The Plaintiffs were 
aware of ongoing developments in 2011 through 2014. The Plaintiffs recognized that eventually 
commercial development would occur, and the type of development would dictate the location of 
the entrance off Primrose, and that it could not be determined in advance. 
The value of the Plaintiffs' lot has diminished to nearly nothing. None of the adjacent 
commercial lots have been developed, and now the defendant refuses to comply with the Master 
plan with regard to 195 Primrose. 
The Plaintiffs request this court reverse the Order Granting Summary Judgment to 
Defendant, and remand the matter to the District Court for trial and for attorney fees and costs on 
appeal as argued above. 
submitted this 
Of Swafford Law, PC 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
ofNovember, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the parties designated below and by the method of delivery indicated: 
Sean Moulton 
Moulton Law Office 
PO Box 631 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Dated this day of November, 2016. 
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